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Abstract
The growing market of the mobile application is overtaking the web application. Mobile application
development environment is open source, which attracts new inexperienced developers to gain hands on
experience with applicationn development. However, the security of data and vulnerable coding practice is an
issue. Among all mobile Operating systems such as, iOS (by Apple), Android (by Google) and Blackberry
(RIM), Android dominates the market. The majority of malicious mobile attacks take advantage of
vulnerabilities in mobile applications, such as sensitive data leakage via the inadvertent or side channel,
unsecured sensitive data storage, data transition and many others. Most of these vulnerabilities can be
detected during mobile application analysis phase. In this paper, we explore vulnerability detection for static
and dynamic analysis tools. We also suggest limitations of the tools and future directions such as the
development of new plugins.
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INTRODUCTION  
     In 2018, a report by Statcounter Global (Statcounter, 2018) suggested that Android dominates 
the smartphone market with 76.6% share with over two billion users active monthly. 
Consequently, this gigantic market of potential victims has not remained unnoticed by 
cybercriminals and online malicious users. Over the years, several third party websites and 
application stores have emerged on the internet that allow android phone users to download and 
install android application which are otherwise deemed malicious or dangerous by Google’s Play 
store. These websites and stores often contain and advertise several malicious versions of various 
otherwise pay-to-use android applications on the Google Play store.  
     The attackers exploit typical human nature, by advertising these applications as free to use, 
which often results in large download traffic of these malicious applications through these websites 
and stores. To make matters worse, these websites are often unmonitored and ungoverned, which 
allows virtually anyone to upload malicious software online without the supervision of any 
centralized or decentralized authority. This malicious software are generally packed with several 
forms of malware payloads including but not limited to, trojans, botnets, and spyware. These 
applications can easily help in theft of valuable personal information regarding an android phone 
user such as, usernames, passwords, Social Security Numbers (SSN), Health history, location 
history and much more. 
      Recent reports have suggested that the number of overall malware attacks over the internet is 
still growing exponentially. Moreover, the majority of these attacks are targeted on the Android 
platform. According to a Kaspersky Labs report, more than 291,800 malware programs had 
surfaced over the second quarter of the year 2015. This increase was over 2.8 times more than the 
number of malwares surfacing the first quarter of the same year. Additionally, the number of such 
malware applications installed from various untrusted third-party websites and stores increased by 
over one million in shear numbers over the same time period. 
     With this explosive rise in the number of Android malware applications, analysis, detection and 
prevention against such applications has become a critical research topic. Several techniques, 
frameworks, tools and software have been proposed in literature to prevent and detect such 
applications. Consequently, the research in Android security and analysis has transitioned into a 
wide domain both in academic and enterprise communities. Despite many tools are available, there 
are limited resources in the literature emphasizing hands-on application of the tools for analyzing 
malware.  
     In this work, we explore two analysis tools (static and dynamic) to analyze the source code and 
behavior of android applications. Static analysis is the analysis without actually running the source 
code of the software or application under test, whereas, dynamic analysis tends to be much more 
comprehensive and informative, since such type of analysis is performed under actual code 
execution.  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
     The growth of mobile market and its development is increasing. In accordance with the security 
and privacy of users data in the mobile application is also an issue with higher priority. Most of 
the mobile application gets access to secret information of the user. To review the security hole in 
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the application, the number tools that we have in the market is not enough. Most of the useful tools 
has been developed a long time ago which has almost no effectiveness to current features. In this 
paper we reviewed coupe of renowned security tools that were effectively used in the past to detect 
security problems in the Android Application. Interested readers can see the extensive survey by 
Kong et al. (2019) for other related work.  
 
CuckooDroid 
     Cuckoo is a premier malware analyzing software. It is capable of methodically examining 
multiple variants of malware through the use of virtual machines that monitor the behavior in a 
protected and isolated atmosphere (Cuckoo, 2019). It is written in the python programming 
language and facilitates its analysis in both the static and dynamic dimension. Cuckoo is an open 
source programmed malware analysis system. It’s used to run and investigate files and gather 
inclusive analysis results that framework what the malware is and does even though running inside 
a secluded Windows OS. It can generate the below results:  
• Files created, deleted, and downloaded by the malware  
• Memory dumps of the malware processes.   
• Traces of win32 API calls accomplished by all processes produced by the malware.  
• Network traffic trace in PCAP format. 
• Full memory dumps of the machines.  
     The sandbox of Cuckoo started back in 2010, it started as a Google summer of code project 
within the honeynet project (Cuckoo, 2019). The first beta release of Cuckoo was released on Feb 
2011 and then in March 2011, it was selected again as a supported project. After many versions of 
the sandbox, Cuckoo sandbox was released in April 2014. 
     It comprises of a host that is responsible for the sample execution and the analysis in which the 
guests run. So, when the host has to launch a new analysis, it chooses the guests and uploads that 
sample as well as the other components that are required by the guest to function (Li, 2016). 
Cuckoo initializes modules when it first starts up and when there is a new task sent to Cuckoo, it 
identifies the file by using the machinery modules which is used to interrelate with the diverse 
possible virtualization systems, and its config, it installs what is known as the analyzer inside one 
of the available virtual machines. 
     Once the analysis has completed, the analyzer refers the results of the analysis to the 
ResultServer, which in turn will implement whichever processing modules are configured (the 
modules used to populate the product of the analysis, the report) and produce the report. The 
analysis took place in the virtualized machine, it has the monitoring system components The proxy 
is a python script that intervals listening to a port in the guest machine. When a new inquiry is 
launched in the machine, the host sends the equivalent analyzer (the component in charge of 
managing the analysis inside the machine) and the package module used to accomplish the sample 
sent, which depends on the type of sample. 
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     For instance, the array used to implement an exe file will be altered from that used to open a 
PDF sample, or a ZIP file. When the mockup completes its implementation, or a break is reached, 
the analyzer stops the analysis, collects the results from the monitor, and sends them back to the 
result server. 
FlowDroid 
     With increasing data leaks happening, privacy is a very important concept to maintain. Most 
privacy leaks are due to flaws in the code that could have been prevented if it noticed and fixed in 
a timely manner. At a high level view, FlowDroid is an open source Java based tool that can be 
used to analyze Android applications for potential data leakage. FlowDroid is the first full context, 
object sensitive, field, flow, and static taint analysis tool that specifically models the full Android 
lifecycle with high precision and recall (Artz et al., 2013).  The tool can detect and analyze data 
flows, specifically an Android application’s bytecode, and configuration files, to find any possible 
privacy vulnerabilities, also known as data leakage. It is not meant to analyze malware 
(Fratantonio, 2016).  FlowDroid does different types of taint analysis: objective sensitive, flow, 
context, field, and lifecycle aware (Reaves et al., 2016). In regards to reflective calls, FlowDroid 
can only fix reflective calls who has constant strings as parameters (Qiu, 2018).   
      This tool can be built using Maven, a build automation tool for Java projects, or Eclipse, an 
IDE used for software development. The data tracker can used from the command line (Flowdroid, 
2019). This tool cannot be used in Android Studio since it is not an Android application. These 
additional tools need to be downloaded in order for FlowDroid to run properly. Those tools are: 
Jasmin, Soot, Heros, and GitHub repositories soot-infoflow and soot-infoflow-android 
(Flowdroid, 2019). Jasmin is an open source tool that can convert Java classes ACII descriptions 
into binary Java class files that can be loaded into a Java interpreter (Jasmin, 2019). Soot is an 
open source Java optimization framework that has four different types of representation of 
analyzing and changing Java bytecode (Soot, 2008). Heros is a general implementation of an IFDS 
and IDE framework solution that can be integrated into an existing Java program analysis 
framework (Heroes, 2019).  
     Based on Reaves et al. (2016) experience with setting up FlowDroid, it took 1.45 hours for 
them to fully and properly set up the tool. They had to download missing SDK files that were 
necessary to run DroidBench, as well as, Flow Droid .jar files. 2 minutes were spent changing 
configuration settings of the analyzed mobile applications. 
     FlowDroid uses an analysis technique based on an analysis framework that does not rely on 
every program path (Artz et al., 2013). This means that every program path does not need to be 
analyzed. Android applications does not contain a main method in their code. Instead, they have 
methods that are indirectly invoked upon by the Android framework. This leads to a problem where 
Android analyzing tools cannot start the analyzing process by evaluating the main method of the 
program. FlowDroid solves this problem by generating and analyzing a fake main method where 
there is every possible life cycle arrangement of separate application components and callbacks. It 
is not necessary to go through all the possible paths, because the technique previously stated solves 
this problem, and it would also be expensive to implement.  
     FlowDroid uses a call graph technique to accurately map components to callbacks, which leads 
to minimal false positives and lowered taint analysis running time. The tool generates one call 
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graph for each application component. The call graph is used in the process of scanning calls to 
Android system methods that has a popular callback interface as a parameter. The call graph gets 
extended until all callbacks are found. FlowDroid was tested for malware analysis along with three 
other analysis tools. The other three analysis tools were Kirin, TriggerScope, DroidAPIMiner. 
Among the other analysis tools, FlowDroid had the highest false positive percentage, and second 
lowest false negative percentage. This tool is not great at malware detection, specifically logic 
bombs, because that was not the intended purpose of this tool. A logic bomb is an unauthorized 
software that changes the output of the Android application or does applications actions that are 
not intended (Fratantonio, 2016).  
DroidBox  
     DroidBox is a dynamic malware analysis tool for Android applications. DroidBox v4.1.1 is a      
framework for analyzing automatically Android applications. It uses a modified version of the 
Android emulator 4.1.1_rc6 enabling to track Android applications' activity, i.e., tainted data 
leaked out, SMS sent, network communications, etc. It is composed of two folds: one fold on the 
guest machine (Android emulator) that tracks the Android application's activity and sends the 
corresponding DroidBox logs through ADB to the host machine and the other fold on the host 
machine that parses the ADB log to extract the log of DroidBox (2019). The release has only been 
tested on Linux and Mac OS. If you do not have the Android SDK, download it from 
http://developer.android.com/sdk/index.html. The following libraries are required: pylab and 
matplotlib to provide visualization of the analysis result. 
 
Export the path for the SDK tools. 
$ export PATH=$PATH:/path/to/android-sdk/tools/ 
$ export PATH=$PATH:/path/to/android-sdk/platform-tools/ 
 




Setup a new AVD targeting Android 4.1.2 and choose Nexus 4 as device as well as ARM as CPU 
type by running: 
Start the emulator with the new AVD: 
 
$ ./startemu.sh <AVD name> 
 
When emulator has booted up, start analyzing samples (please use the absolute path to the apk): 
 
$ ./droidbox.sh <file.apk> <duration in secs (optional)>  
 
The analysis is currently not automated except for installing and starting packages. Ending the 
analysis is simply done by pressing Ctrl-C.  
 
     DroidBox analyses incoming and outgoing network activity in an application. It also records 
and analyses all file read and or write activity of an application. All initialized services and loaded 
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classes are recorded and analyzed through DexClassLoader component. It also reports on any 
information leakages either through network activity, file operations, and or SMS. It also monitors 
security permission protocols and returns warnings in case a protocol is circumvented. If there are 
any broadcast activity, DroidBox monitors and lists all receivers and listeners. As default, 
DroidBox monitors all calls and SMS activity, analyses each one and returns results. Additionally, 
two graphs are generated visualizing the behavior of the package. One showing the temporal order 
of the operations and the other one being a treemap that can be used to check similarity between 
analyzed packages (Droidbox, 2019). In the graph showing the temporal order of application 
behavior, DroidBox maps each activity to a specific timestamps which provides an overview of 
the linear behavior of the application based on Android system events. These events could be 
sending SMS, making a call, read/write or other internal system activity.  
 
Figure 1. Apk Test result by DroidBox 
 
     The second graph presents a simple image that shows the similarity between packages and 
related operations carried out on them. This enables the user to easily locate related packages that 
were affected as part of a specific operation. 
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Figure 2. Comparison between packages and related operation 
 
     Unlike MobSF that provides output targeting the specific source of a behavior, DroidBox 
provides and overview of the related packages and type of behavior such as SMS, network 
leakages, etc. that occurred. Although DroidBox indicates the general behavior and possible 
suspect packages, it does not pinpoint the source code. Other tools such as MobSF provides a 
indicate to what source is related to the behavior and captures timeline of behavior. However, it 
must noted that DroidBox provides relevant information regarding multiple behavior of packages 
and application. DroidBox analysis may be used to have an overview of malware behavior  and 
can provide suggestions as to which specific packages and resources in which security testing 
could begin. DroidBox is a good analysis tool that can be used in the early states of dynamic 
malware analysis in Android applications. Although it provides some helpful output to identify 
application behavior and localize affected packages, it does not give detailed information about 
what the underlying code is nor does it provide any output to what specific modules in the code 
that is responsible for the output behavior and what steps must be taken to remove and or 
quarantine the affected packages. Droidbox is a purely dynamic analyses tool. It does not perform 
any static analyses. Hence, for a user who wants to do both dynamic and static analyses, they 
would need to install another tool to perform static analysis. 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
     In this section we are going to discuss about static and dynamic analysis of malware application. 
Static analysis approach analyzes the source apk file of android application, and identifies possible 
security risks without actually running on a mobile device or emulator. On the other hand, a 
dynamic analysis approach runs an apk file into a virtual emulator and analyzes activities 
performed to identify malicious activities.  
     We collected 1260 malware applications from different third party marketplaces. For example, 
Contagiodump (2019). Later we examined couple of applications using static and dynamic analysis 
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tool. We tested these malware samples in Mobile Security Framework (MobSF, 2019) and 
Flowdroid (2019). However, there are a couple of more analysis tools available for the analysis 
such as DroidBox, CuckooDroid, and DroidSafe. At first, we tried all the mentioned tools here. 
However, we found MobSF and Flowdroid are the most effective and updated tool among all. 
Table 1 shows the list of tables and their coverage in terms of static and dynamic analysis of apk 
files. 
Table 1: Analysis coverage of example tools 
Tool Static analysis Dynamic analysis 
Cuckoodroid No Yes 
Flowdroid Yes No 
Droidbox No Yes 
MobiSF Yes Yes 
 
Static Analysis by MobSF 
Android is a combined form of java and xml. It uses Linux operating system which is developed 
for embedded systems and mobile devices. The upper layers of Android language is written by 
itself. For Graphical User Interface (GUI) android uses XML layout files, it also uses event-based 
library. Static analysis refers to decompiling the APK of an application to its corresponding Java 
and XML files. To perform static analysis a static analyzer must have features to examine XML 
with correctness and precision. Java files can be extracted by DEXtoJar decompiler (Skylot, 2019). 
A Static analysis tool de-compiles the code of an APK to human readable format. So that an 
analyzer can read the code and identify the vulnerability that an application could have. “Mobile 
Security Framework (MobSF)” is a combined tool which does the static and dynamic analysis of 
an APK. MobSF is developed based on Python 3.7. To generate the report MobSF uses html. It 
runs the local server via command line in the host computer. All the existing static and dynamic 
analysis tool do the analysis using DroidMon-Dalvik Monitoring Framework (Idan, 2019) and 
Xposed Module Repository (Rovo, 2019). Xposed is a framework that can change the behavior of 
the system and apps without touching the APK (Spreitzenbarth et al., 2014). MobSF (2019) works 
fine in Windows 7 and 10, macOs(El capitan, high Sierra), Linux(Kali, Ubuntu 16.04). We used 
MacOS high sierra to perform the analysis. To start the development server the following 
command has to be executed on the terminal. 
 
 
   Figure 3. Terminal Command to start server MobSF 
 
Figure 3, shows the terminal command for unix operating system to start development server. The 
command will initiate the development server at “http://127.0.0.1:8000/”. In this development 
server we can upload the APK file for analysis. The dynamic environment is also available in the 
development server. See the image below. 
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Figure 4. Development server running by MobSF 
 
Figure 4, show the development server running at “http://127.0.0.1:8000/”. We have tested couple 
of APK files using MobSF. A vulnerable APK has been tested by MobSF that contains a SQL 
injective query in it. The application finds data from the database based on user input. It performs 
a raw query without sanitizing the user input. Which dumps all the content from the database. 
Later it tries to send the data to a static number that is hardcoded in the application. Figure 5, shows 
SMS API permission used in the manifest   
 
  
Figure 5. Permission Analysis  
 
     MobSF finds the Android API call in an application that also finds the corresponding java file 
for example, in this application SMS API has been called in the MainActivity.java file. See the 
image below. 
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Figure 6. API call  
 
Dynamic Analysis by MobSF 
     Dynamic analysis refers to analyzing the functionality of an application in an isolated device 
or emulator. In terms of emulator it should be launched on a virtual machine in the host computer 
that keep our host computer safe from being affected. We did dynamic analysis using MobSF’s 
pre configured Android virtual machine (MobiSF, 2019). We used a sample malware apk which 
apparently look like a movie player. To start analysis virtual environment has to be created first. 
See the image below to create a virtual environment in a virtual box. 
 
 
Figure 7. Virtual Environment MobSF 
 
     Figure 7, show the virtual environment created to perform the dynamic analysis of an 
application. Here we found a couple of options for analysis such as Activity Tester, Screenshot of 
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each screen, Adb command execution field. After successful installation of the apk, we got a POP 
up window that show a notification for sending a text message to a static number. See Figure 8, 
below.  
 
Figure 8. Dynamic analysis of android application in MobSF 
 
     MobSF also generates the dynamic analysis report. After finishing the analysis process it 
produces an analysis report in HTML format. See images below for dynamic analysis report. 
 
 
Figure 9. Dynamic analysis report 
 
 
Figure 10. Dynamic analysis report 
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     Figures 9 and 10 show the dynamic reports which clarify that the application sends text message 
to hard coded numbers. In Figure 10, we also found the database journal that has been created in 
the device through this application. 
 
Tainted Data Flow Analysis 
     Android has multiple data sources as well as sinks. Most of the sinks are built in API’s for 
example, SMS API, CALL API etc. An application get takes data through these sources for 
processing. Soot and Heroes are FlowAnalysis tool built to analyze java application (Soot, 2008; 
Heroes, 2019). Soot uses worklist algorithm to do static data flow analysis. It has FlowAnalyis 
classes for fixed-point computation of static data flow analysis. There are classes as well for 
ForwardAnalysis and BackwardAnalysis (Soot, 2008). Heros (2019) is an extension of soot, it 
requires its implementation as a class that extends SceneTransformer. FlowDroid is a data flow 
analysis tool which is built over soot and heros to do static data flow analysis from source to sink 
of an Android Application (Talukder, Shahriar and Haddad, 2019). FlowDroid does context, flow, 
field and object-sensitive analyses. To increase recall, it creates a complete model of Android’s 




Figure 11. Data flow from source to sink 
 
     In Figure 11, in main the function a source encountered. The value of the source is attached 
with the object that has been passed as a formal parameter to the function. In this case when the 
object has been initialized in main ultimately receives the source data and finally passed to the 
sink. 
     In this project, we performed data flow analysis using FlowDroid. In Android, SQLinjection is 
possible because android has the feature SQLite Database. We did our analysis on an application 
that has fetch username and password from the database and sends it to number via SMS API. 
Following command will start the analysis. 
java -jar soot-infoflow-cmd/target/soot-infoflow-cmd-jar-with-dependencies.jar \ 
    -a <APK File> \ 
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    -p <Android JAR folder> \ 
    -s <SourcesSinks file> 
java -jar soot-infoflow-cmd/target/soot-infoflow-cmd-jar-with-dependencies.jar \ 
    -a <APK File> \ 
    -p <Android JAR folder> \ 
    -s <SourcesSinks file> \ 
    -o <Xml file for output> 
     Here ‘-a’ is the path of the APK file, ‘-p’ is the path of the platforms folder that could be found 
under sdk folder of the android directory, ‘-s’ is a text file where we can declare the possible 
sources and sinks for the analysis, ‘-o’ is an additional parameter for the analysis that is used to 
produce an output file as a XML file.  
 
 
Figure 12. SourcesSinks.txt file 
 
     Figure 12, is sample SourceSinks.txt file that has all the possible sources and sinks declared in 
it. Figure 13 shows only one data leak in this application. 
 
 
Figure 13. Data flow analysis by FlowDroid 
 
     Here, we find one sink inside the onCreate() method of the MainActivity.java file that is 
sendTextMessage() method in the SMS manager API. Where possible sources for this sink are 
getString() methods that has been found in showResult() method in the MainActivity.java class 
(Talukder et al., 2019). 
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     This paper presents the analysis report of existing mobile security tools we have in the market. 
We found that Flowdroid was the best analysis tools for detecting malware in malicious 
applications. In addition, we have also provided a review of all the state-of-the-art research in both 
academic and enterprise communities in this report. Based on the results obtained from this 
empirical study, we found an extremely trivial, but critical flaw in the Android application 
development environments, i.e., Android Studio, which is the most widely used development 
environment for building Android applications. It does not have any comprehensive in-built 
security analysis module. We propose that the community to look into building a security analysis 
plugin based on open source tools such as Flowdroid to improve the native security testing ability 
of Android Studio.  Most of the Android Application is data driven app now a days. It is high time 
to develop a plugin for Android Studio that will be capable of detecting the tainted data flow in 
the application detecting the source and sinks of data.  
     In continuation of this research we already started our project towards development of a plugin 
for Android Studio that will be capable of doing tainted data flow analysis during the development 
phase of the application. Since Android Studio is extremely resource intensive, especially on 
system Random Access Memory (RAM), the challenge to developers will be making such a plugin 
lightweight so that it integrates seamlessly with Android Studio without intensively consuming 
more system resources.  
     A step in this direction could greatly improve Android Studio as new and immature developers 
will have the ability to test their Android applications before deploying them on the open Google 
Store market for the general public to download and take advantage of, thus, possibly reducing the 
risk of privacy invasion, and data leakage and stealth with the use of malwares and spywares. For 
the future, we propose the development of a plugin or a native module for Android Studio which 
allows both experienced and inexperienced application developers to easily test their applications 
before deploying them on the open Google Play Store application market. This would make the 
consumers much more immune to malicious attacks based on malwares and spywares.  We hope 
that as a consequence of the results and analysis obtained from our work, both the academic and 
enterprise communities could come up with innovative ideas, approaches, tools and plugins for 
the advancement and improvement of the current state of the domain. 
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